To suggest that our knowledge of psychiatry lags perhaps a century behind that of general medicine would be unlikely to occasion much dissent. However, the treatment of psychiatric conditions has been showing signs of significant advance while the understanding of aetiologies is coming along more slowly and painfully, the controversies engendered in the process producing a sense of d6ji vu when placed in historical context. Not surprisingly, many of the issues have been tossed about before in other branches of medicine (with the same concurrent aggression no doubt) although not everyone caught up in the contemporary fray appears to be able to recognize this and obtain profit from it.
Whilst deductions and hypotheses in medicine over the ages have subsequently been revealed as of highly variable quality, sometimes to the point of absurdity, observations of clinical phenomena have usually been remarkably accurate even from earliest times. The former, whilst presenting illusions of objectivity, can easily become entangled with emotional attitudes and social fashions, while this is less likely of the latter.
The starting point of medicine has usually tended to be from symptoms and signs, which can be complained of, seen and described. But the journeys from perceiving presentations to understanding aetiology have been strewn with errors and are likely to prove even more ridden by obstacles in psychiatry where clinical signs so far remain relatively inconspicuous.
Let us take an historical example from general medicine. Dropsy has always been an easily recognizable condition, described for centuries. But the great Thomas Sydenham (1624-89) (Clendening, 1942) . This early association between some cardiac conditions and oedema began the transition from a symptom-orientated concept to an understanding of aetiology via the empirical discovery of effective medication, which was further advanced by the classical report of Richard Bright (1789-1858) implicating renal disease in some cases of dropsy (Singer and Ashworth Underwood, 1962) .
A progression becomes apparent. First, a physical sign is regarded as a disease-entity because it is the only means of recognition, then by the discovery of treatment (in which the foxglove cures some but not all cases of dropsy) the original disease-entity is no longer tenable. Later, by more searching observation, other associations of the physical sign may be found, from which a potential differential diagnostic classification becomes possible (clinical differentiation between cardiac and renal oedema). Subsequently, detailed scientific study produces precise physiological information with the discovery of the fundamental processes involved (the physiology and pathology of oedema become understood) (Fig. 1) . Now, dare we substitute 'depression' for 'dropsy'? There are protests at once. The mind is not the body, with psychological phenomena you cannot be dogmatic, you cannot employ organic concepts, each personality is unique, emotional experience is not amenable to classification. The 'medical model' is inappropriate for the affairs of the human mind (a sentiment which recalls nothing so much as religious resistance to early tentative scientific advances). Implicit in the contemporary insistence that diagnosis in psychiatry is a sterile exercise is either that all psychiatric patients need all types of treatments, only one, or else none. The process of diagnosis can be seen simply in terms of an attempt to decide which therapeutic approach is most appropriate.
One wonders why there is such a widespread need to believe that the mind reacts only to the environment and, unlike all other physiological systems, cannot be vulnerable to internal metabolic processes as well. How else can the mind function except by physiological processes of some kind-for all that they themselves may be modified by exeriences? Contrary to increasingly noisy contemporary protestations, psychiatry may have much to learn from the theories of general medicine.
There is a further difficulty with regard to depression, a semantic one. We use the word subjectively to include all kinds of psychological states, including disappointment, boredom, feeling fed up, unhappy or miserable as well as for extreme despair. Sandison (1972) pertinently suggests that depression is 'a thin word, declaring a position of hopelessness and despair. It contrasts with ... melancholy, the black humour, for, as a 16th century physician put it, "melancholy occupies the mind and changes the temperature of it"' (P.K.B.'s italics). So, when various emotional states are described as depression, how much have they got in common? Can 'depression' describe, as often suggested, a totally pathological emotional experience (endogenous), an enhanced degree of the emotion beyond the normal range (neurotic) as well as an adaptive and normal, if uncomfortable, emotional state (e.g. grief)?
Whether there are essentially different types of experiences called depression or whether there is a continuum of depressive emotion would be hard to resolve in the present state of knowledge, but this aspect probably matters less for the moment than a consideration of possible causes. After all, breathlessness might be considered either as a continuum or as consisting of several separate experiences of respiratory difficulty, but there are nonetheless all kinds of different implications in the breathlessness of a fit person after strenuous exercise, of someone with cardiac insufficiency after mild exertion, and of a patient with pneumothorax at rest. In none of these circumstances would a disease-concept called 'dyspnoea' be of much clinical value, although it Foxglove:
Oedema due to: As with the use of foxglove for dropsy, physical treatments for depression may be the next stage in elucidation of the origins of the symptom. They offer at least one piece of objective information, available since the 1930s but relatively little emphasized, that some cases of depression respond decisively to, for example, ECT while others do not. The apparent therapeutic specificity of the antidepressants, unlike the non-specific stimulation of the amphetamines, points in a similar direction. Just as there was a 'foxglove-responsive' oedema which subsequently proved to be of cardiac origin, there appears to be a form of depression readily responsive to physical treatments, suggesting a specific cause.
This possibility underlies the proposed dichotomy between exogenous and endogenous forms of depression which has produced one of those irresolvable controversies which seem endemic in psychiatric writing (Lewis, 1971 The exact contribution of early experience to the subsequent onset of depression is unclear (Birtchnell, 1970; Munro, 1966) . The psychodynamic approach to psychiatric conditions traces causes from early life, quite reasonably, but makes little or no allowance for differences of individual emotional responsiveness (Bridges and Jones, 1973) . For example, it is a common observation that some individuals are naturally placid and some over-excitable. It is surely worth considering that many patients show intrinsically enhanced emotional reactions to situations that others, who are constitutionally less likely to be emotionally overloaded, adapt to more readily.
It is often assumed that the emotional response is directly related to the degree of emotional stress and the intermediate variable of individual responsiveness is usually little taken into account. If the response is directly related to the stress then the stress is of fundamental importance, whereas if there is a variability in emotional responsiveness, then this may be relatively more important than the evoking stress. In the latter case the response is likely to require more therapeutic attention than its stimulus, which is a justification for emphasis on physical treatments in appropriate cases.
With their almost exclusive preoccupation with the detection of causes located in the individual's past, the psychodynamic schools have tended to ignore relative responsiveness which has led to a tendency in clinical psychiatry to become preoccupied with obsessively complete histories, while offering little guidance as to priorities and emphasis. Within their histories it is often difficult to see the wood (of that which is of clinical significance) for the trees (of historical details). One can, however, feel reassured that they contain that which is being sought-but where is it and how much is really relevant?
The difficulties experienced with the reliability of psychiatric diagnosis are often blamed upon false theories but it is even more likely that the intuitive, descriptive methods that have to be employed at the moment are just too crude to succeed with any accuracy and should be accepted as such without too much over-defensiveness. Learning this lesson from the past would save a lot of polemics and associated autonomic wear and tear for the disputants.
However, progression to more valid concepts about depression could follow as in Fig. 2 . This takes into account the possible specific alleviation of some forms of depression by anti-depressant medication, which has been mentioned. It proposes that there are other forms of depression with other causes and associations, and there is likely to be considerable overlap which cannot as yet be resolved as our methods of delineation are too crude. One may as well try to differentiate anxiety states from thyrotoxicoses, for example, without means of measuring thyroid function. By careful observation, it may be possible in some cases, but most of the others will be in doubt.
Another example of the fallacies attendant on preoccupation with symptom-syndromes is to be found in the relationship between anxiety and depression. Traditionally these two symptoms have been regarded as essentially separate although they may overlap, and each had its particular methods of treatment. However, clinical experience now suggests some cases of both anxiety and also of depression have a common aetiology on the basis that anxiety can respond to the same physical treatments as do some forms of depression. On this proposition the original concept of two-clinical entities, synonymous with symptoms, then becomes rearranged so that the new postulated syndrome cuts across the previous classification (Fig. 3) .
The implications of a name for a syndrome or disease became increasingly apparent. It can artificially narrow the clinical concept. ' fundamentally than with abnormal autonomic activity, although its presentation focuses the mind on respiration. Endogenous depression seems to be a condition with genetic associations which may involve a cerebral biochemical vulnerability (Medical Research Council, 1972 (Pollitt, 1965; Davies, Carroll and Mowbray, 1972 These ideas are not meant to have relevance to the whole field of psychiatry and psychology. They are an attempt to suggest that the medical model has importance for some aspects of mental health and is not to be lightly discarded in a wave of sociological enthusiasm for the idea that we are only the products of our environment with an exclusive need for selfexpression and revolution rather than phenothiazines and behaviour therapy. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that the tremendous advances in the treatment of psychiatric patients that have occurred in the past 25 years or so have depended much more upon the discovery of new drugs than upon the exploitation of psychodynamic concepts, old or new.
Thus from the hypotheses and methods which can be learnt from general medicine, more specific psychiatric treatments may be discovered and, just as important, methods of more accurate diagnosis may be found by which the most effective type of therapy can be selected in relation to individual cases. For some patients physical treatments will be decided upon with confidence as to their relevance and chance of success. This leaves other areas of emotional distress and social maladjustment to be dealt with by different means. Certainly a few patients will require a combination of different methods-psychological, behavioural and physical. But the allotment of resources and their relative priorities should depend upon as careful a clinical assessment as can be achieved in our present state of knowledge. Everyone does not require the same type of treatment but neither, alternatively, should every patient have a little of all therapies. Resources and research will be most effectively employed in attempting, first to break down problems into disparate aspects, and then to investigate appropriate specific solutions. Psychiatry has now matured beyond a need for the security of a single system of beliefs which purport to explain everything, absolutely everything (Slater, 1975) .
